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                IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
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                    FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA
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     KELVIN D. DANIEL, et al
                                      Case No.: 2:11-CV-01548-ROS
 24
               Plaintiffs,
 25
          vs.
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     SWIFT TRANSPORTATION
                                      MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN SUPPORT
 27
                                      OF PLAINTIFFS' RESPONSE TO
     CORPORATION,
                                      DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS
 28
               Defendant
                               EXHIBIT
                Document 2
                                   0/31/11 Page 1 of 10 PageID #: 219
Case 1:11-cv-00181
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Background I.

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MEMORANDUM OF LAW

On August 8, 2011, Plaintiffs filed a Class Action Complaint and Demand for Jury against Defendant, Swift Transportation Corporation ("Swift"). The Complaint alleges that Swift violated certain provisions of the Fair Credit Reporting Act, ("FCRA"), 15 U.S.C. Sec. reports for in its use of consumer seq. Swift is alleged to have employment purposes. purchased consumer reports about job applicants without FCRA compliant notice first providing an obtaining a proper authorization from each applicant. The Complaint further alleged that Swift violated the 'pre-adverse action', 'adverse action' and other notice provisions of the FCRA when it denied employment based upon the consumer reports.

On October 3, 2011, Swift filed a partial motion to dismiss pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b) seeking to dismiss Count One as it pertains to Daniel and Bell, Count Two as it pertains to Daniel, and Count Three as it pertains to Daniel, Hodges and Bell. On October 24, 2011, Plaintiffs timely filed their first Amended

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Complaint pursuant to Fed R. Civ. P. 15(a)(1)(B). Said Amended Complaint renders Swift's Motion to Dismiss and the arguments contained therein as moot.

II. Argument as to Mootness

A. Plaintiffs' First Amended Complaint renders Swift's Motion to Dismiss moot.

F.R.Civ.P 15(a)(1)(B) permits a party to amend a pleading as a matter of course and without leave of court, even if a responsive pleading has been served, as long as the motion is timely. To be timely, it must be filed twenty-one (21) days after service of a responsive pleading or twenty-one (21) days service of a motion under 12(b), (e), and (f), whichever is earlier. The effect of a timely motion is to render any motion grounded in Fed. Civ. R. P. 12 subsections (b), (e), and (f) moot. See Peak N.D., LLC v. Wilkinson, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 52239 at *7-*8 (D.N.D. May 25, 2010). In this matter, Swift filed its Answer and Fed. Civ. R. 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss on October 3, 2011. Plaintiffs filed the First Amended Complaint on October 24, 2011, within 21 day after service of Swift's Motion. The Amended Complaint,

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being filed timely under Fed. Civ. R. 15(a)(1)(B), therefore renders Swift's Motion to Dismiss moot.

III. Alternative Response to Motion To Dismiss.

Plaintiffs' First Amended Complaint cures the issues set forth in Swift's Motion to Dismiss.

1. Count One.

Swift argues that 15 U.S.C. Sec. 1681b(b)(2)(A) does not apply to Daniel or Bell. This section provides that an employer may not procure a consumer report for employment purposes unless a written standalone, clear and conspicuous disclosure is provided to the job applicant prior to the report being procured, and only if the consumer has authorize this procurement in writing. Notably, this section does not apply to job applicants who seek positions regulated by the U.S. Secretary of Transportation (e.g., trucking positions) and whose only interaction with the employer is by mail, telephone, computer, or other similar means. See 15 U.S.C. § 1681b(b)(2(C). For these applicants, 15 U.S.C. § 1681b(b)(2)(B) requires that at any time prior to a consumer report being procured, the employer must provide the applicant, by oral, written or electronic means, notice that a consumer report may be obtained

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for employment purposes, as well as a summary of the applicant's rights under Section 1681m(a)(3). The job applicant then must provide oral, written or electronic consent prior to the procurement of the consumer report.

Swift argues that the requirements of 15 U.S.C. § Daniel (and not the apply to 1681b(b)(2)(B) stringent requirements of 15 U.S.C. § 1681b(b)(2)(A) as set forth in Count One) because he applied for a facts trucking position via the internet. But the demonstrate that although pertaining to Daniel initially applied for a position online, Swift later had in-person contact with him prior to procuring his Because of this in person contact, consumer report. and pursuant to 1681b(b)(2)(C)(ii)¹, Swift was required to provide Daniel with a written, clear and conspicuous stand-alone disclosure and obtain his written consent as required by §§ 1681b(b)(2)(A)(i) and (ii) prior to procuring his consumer report for employment purposes. Plaintiffs' First Amended Complaint clarifies that

^{1 15} U.SC. § 1681b(b)(2)(C)(ii) provides that the less stringent notice and authorization provisions in 1681b(b)(2)(B) only occur when at the time the employer procures the consumer report, the only interaction between the applicant and the employer has been by mail, telephone, computer or other similar means.

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Swift had in-person contact with Daniel prior to it procuring his consumer report. Construing the facts in favor of Daniel provides him with a viable cause of action and renders this portion of Swift's Motion to Dismiss moot.

As an aside, Swift further argues that Count One does not apply to Bell because he applied via facsimile. Plaintiffs' First Amended Complaint withdraws Bell as a party under Count One, rendering Swift's Motion to Dismiss him from the same moot.

2. Count Two

Swift similarly seeks a partial dismissal of Daniel from Count Two of Plaintiffs' First Complaint arguing that 15 U.S.C. §1681b(b)(3)(A)'s pre-adverse action rights do not apply to Daniel since he applied for a position via the internet. This section provides that prior to taking any adverse action, based in whole or in part on the report, the employer shall provided the job applicant with a copy of the consumer report consumer rights written description of and a promulgated by the Federal Trade Commission. These rights provide the applicant the opportunity at least

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to review the consumer report and have an understanding of their rights **prior** to being declined employment or terminated.

These rights, however, are not afforded to applicants who apply for positions (trucking positions) over which the Secretary of Transportation has the power to establish qualifications and maximum hours of Instead, trucking applicants are afforded service. rights under 15 U.S.C. § 1681b(b)(3)(B). This provision allows the employer to decline employment based upon a consumer report, provided that within three (3) days, the applicant receives the following: (1) oral, written or electronic notification that adverse action was taken based in whole or in part on the consumer report; identity and contact information of the (2) the reporting agency; and (3) notice that the reporting agency did not made the adverse decision and notice to the applicant that he or she may, upon providing proper identification, receive a free copy of the report and dispute the information contained therein.

However, as discussed above, Daniel's interaction with Swift **prior** to it procuring his consumer report

went beyond interaction over the mail, telephone, computer or other similar means as conditioned in 15 U.S.C. § 1681b(b)(3)(C)(ii). Instead, Daniel, like many applicants, attended Swift's in-person orientation prior to Swift procuring his consumer report. As such, Daniel, and all others like him, are entitled to Section 1681b(b)(3)(A) protections. With the clarification of these facts set forth in Plaintiffs' First Amended Complaint, Swift's argument to dismiss Count Two is now moot.

3. Count Three

Plaintiffs' Complaint alleges that Swift violated Daniel and Hodges's consumer rights under 15 U.S.C. Sec. 1681m(a)(3)(A) and 15 U.S.C. Sec. 1681m(a)(2)(B) by failing to provide them with proper notice that they could receive a copy of the consumer report used for employment purposes, and that the reporting agency did not make the adverse employment decision. Swift moved to dismiss Count Three as it pertains to both Daniel and Hodges arguing that a majority of District Courts have rejected a private cause of action under 15 U.S.C. § 1681m. Plaintiffs' First Amended Complaint

does not include claims under this section, rendering Swift's motion to dismiss Count Three moot. Respectfully Submitted, STUMPHAUZER O'TOOLE MCLAUGHLIN McGLAMERY & LOUGHMAN CO LPA /s/ Dennis M. O'Toole /s/ Matthew A. Dooley /s/ Anthony R. Pecora LUBIN AND ENOCH, P.C. /s/ Stanley Lubin LITIGATION ASSOCIATES, P.C. /s/ Leonard A. Bennett Counsel for Plaintiffs

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

This will certify that a copy of the foregoing Plaintiffs' Response to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss was filed electronically this 28th day of October, 2011. Notice of this filing will be sent to all counsel of record by operation of the Court's electronic filing system.

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/s/ Anthony R. Pecora

Counsel for Plaintiffs

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